Conditionals

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1 Overview

This chapter provides a survey of the major issues in the syntax of conditionals. We present and critically evaluate the findings in the literature pertaining to conditional structures. We furthermore advance a particular view, not articulated in its entirety before, namely that conditional clauses (e.g., if-clauses) are essentially free relatives of possible worlds. Similarly to the more familiar instances of free relatives of individuals, (i) conditional clauses likely involve clause-internal operator-movement to SpecCP; (ii) they receive the interpretation of definite descriptions; and (iii) they may participate in correlative structures as happens in the subcase of conditionals with the proform then.¹

Conditional structures involve an adverbial clause, often referred to as the conditional clause, antecedent, or protasis (the underlined constituent in (1)), and a main clause, known as the consequent or apodosis. Conditional structures are interpreted, in general terms, with the proposition expressed by the antecedent clause specifying the (modal) circumstances in which the proposition expressed by the main clause is true. Thus, (1) states that the possible worlds/situations in which Andrea arrives late (the denotation of the conditional clause) are possible worlds/situations in which Clara gets upset (the denotation of the main clause).

(1) If Andrea arrives late, Clara will get upset.

Conditionals as in (1) are known as hypothetical conditionals. They are the most common kind of conditional structures discussed in the literature, and consequently, our chapter will mostly focus on them.

Other types of conditionals exist as well, notably relevance conditionals, as illustrated in (2a), and factual conditionals (see Iatridou 1991, also called premise-conditionals in Haegeman 2003), as in (2b):

(2) a. If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.
   b. If Fred is (indeed) so smart, why didn’t he get the job?

In the case of relevance conditionals, clearly the antecedent does not specify the circumstances in which the proposition expressed by the consequent is true, as the latter is, in fact, asserted to be true (in the world of evaluation). Rather, the possible worlds/situations in which the proposition expressed by the antecedent is true, are possible worlds/situations in which it is relevant, from the perspective of the speech act, that the proposition expressed by the consequent clause is true. It is as if in a relevance conditional, there is an implicit performative clause embedding the surface main clause, and this performative is the true consequent in a
Factual conditionals are somewhat harder to distinguish from hypothetical conditionals. According to Iatridou (1991), the conditional clause in a factual conditional is presupposed to be true. Haegeman (2003) notes that while in a hypothetical conditional the antecedent clause is integrated into the speech act of the matrix clause, the antecedent in a factual conditional has an independent illocutionary force.

We note some facts about the syntax of relevance and factual conditionals in section 5, but we remain primarily concerned with hypothetical conditionals in this overview.

Conditionals are not unique in their overall structure; rather, conditional clauses belong to a class of adverbial clauses that includes, among others, clausal adverbials of time, cause, and concession, as illustrated in (3).  

(3) a. If Andrea arrived late, Clara must have gotten upset.  
   b. When Andrea arrived late, Clara got upset.  
   c. Because Andrea arrived late, Clara got upset.  
   d. Although Andrea arrived on time, Clara got upset.

Like the other clausal adverbials, conditional clauses are typically introduced by a CP-related element, a complementizer, or an operator in SpecCP (see if, when, because, although in (3) above). And like the other adverbial clauses, conditional clauses may precede or follow the main clause. Historically, and typologically, clausal adverbials are related, though of course in individual languages they may have undergone distinct development and as a result diverged from each other. For instance, in English, conditionals allow the presence of a proform in the main clause “linked” to the adverbial clause (i.e., then), and concessives do too (i.e., still, nevertheless). However, because-clauses disallow such proforms, and when-clauses allow them only marginally (see (4)).

(4) a. If Andrea arrived late, then Clara must have gotten upset.  
   b. When Andrea arrived late, ("/then) Clara got upset ("then).  
   c. Because Andrea arrived late, ("for that reason) Clara got upset ("for that reason).  
   d. Although Andrea arrived on time, (still/nevertheless) Clara (still/nevertheless) got upset.

In this chapter, we discuss both the internal and external syntax of conditional clauses: the structure of the adverbial CP and the way it is merged to the matrix clause. We draw some, though not extensive, parallels with the other kinds of adverbial clauses, and suggest a direction for their analysis in a uniform manner.

A caveat regarding the scope of our presentation is in order: here we only discuss in detail issues having to do with the syntax of conditionals. Some reference to their semantics is made, when necessary for the exposition, but it is not put in formal terms, and is not claimed to be in any way exhaustive. There is a vast philosophical literature on the topic of conditional reasoning and logic, and also a growing number of formal semantic analyses of conditionals in natural language, to which we
could not do proper justice even in references (still, see Harper, Stalnaker, and Pearce 1981, and Jackson 1991 among many others).

2 Defining conditionals

2.1 What is a conditional?

Before we begin, we have to clarify the basis on which we decide whether a particular sentence is a conditional or not. Above we have defined conditionals as structures involving an adverbial clause interpreted as stating the conditions under which the proposition expressed by main clause is true (or its truth is relevant, as in the case of relevance conditionals). Surely there are other syntactic ways to convey a conditional meaning. The following examples illustrate just such cases:

(5) a. Kiss my dog and you’ll get fleas.
    b. For you to do that would be nice.

Sentence (5a) is interpreted along the lines of If you kiss my dog you’ll get fleas; similarly sentence (5b) receives a conditional interpretation such as It would be nice if you do that. Cases like these are not some peculiarity of English. In a number of languages a structure involving an imperative clause conjoined with a non-past indicative clause receives a conditional interpretation: the imperative clause is interpreted as the antecedent clause of a conditional, and the indicative clause in the coordination is interpreted as the consequent (see Clark 1993; Han 2000, among others). This structure-to-meaning mapping appears to be compositional, given that the coordinating conjunction or has the semantic import of the coordinating conjunction and plus negation of the proposition expressed by the imperative clause. In other words, whereas (6a), with and as the coordinator, is interpreted as if p, q (where p and q are the propositions denoted by the imperative and indicative clauses, respectively), (6b), with or as the coordinator, is interpreted as if ¬p, q. The facts of (6) are furthermore cross-linguistically attested.

(6) a. Kiss my dog and you’ll get fleas.
    b. Kiss my dog or you’ll get fleas.

Turning to (5b), here the relevant facts in deriving the conditional interpretation are the non-finiteness of the sentential subject and the mood morphology in the main clause. In many languages a specialized mood, often called conditional mood, is employed in such cases. Again, as in the case of the conjoined imperative, the two clauses involved in (5b) correspond systematically to the antecedent and consequent of a conditional: the non-finite sentential subject is interpreted as the antecedent, and the main clause is interpreted as the consequent of a conditional. (See Pesetsky 1991 for a discussion of such structures.)

Do the regularities characterizing the structure-to-interpretation mapping in sentences such as the ones in (5) and their cross-linguistic availability justify considering these to be conditionals? We believe that comprehensive discussions of conditionality should include an investigation of cases such as these. The term “conditional” in
its strict sense, however, is being used in the literature only to refer to constructions involving an adverbial clause merged to a particular position in a main clause. We follow this convention here and discuss further only such adverbial structures, partly for reasons of space, partly because the literature has been almost exclusively devoted to the adverbial structures, but partly also because the conventional split isolates a well-defined class of cases whose properties can be fruitfully explored. The fact that we do not mention any further cases like the ones in (5) should not be taken to mean that they should be excluded from a wider study of conditional expressions.

2.2 The marking of conditionals

Languages use a variety of means to indicate that a particular syntactic structure is a conditional rather than some other construction that involves two clauses. Without attempting to give an exhaustive description of the range of options and typological tendencies, we present in this section some of the common structural means of forming conditionals.

Overt marking of the protasis (the antecedent of the conditional) appears to be the commonest strategy, cross-linguistically (see Comrie 1986; Zaefferer 1991). This can be done by employing certain lexical items (i.e., free morphemes), through particular inflectional morphology, or by purely syntactic means (e.g., verb-movement).5 The English if, the German wenn and falls, and the Mandarin Chinese rúguó exemplify the marking of an antecedent using lexical items, arguably functional elements in the CP-domain – complementizers or operators in SpecCP.

(7) a. If it is sunny, I will go for a walk.
   b. German
      Wenn Steffi gewinnt, wird gefeiert.
      if Steffi wins IMPERS.PASS celebrate
      ‘If Steffi wins, people celebrate.’
   c. German
      Falls Steffi gewinnt, wird gefeiert.
      in-case Steffi wins IMPERS.PASS celebrate
      ‘In case Steffi wins, people celebrate.’
   d. Mandarin
      Rúguó Zhangsan hē jīu, wǒ mà tā.
      if Zhangsan drink wine I scold him
      ‘If Zhangsan drinks wine, I will scold him.’

Many languages use temporal who-pronouns (e.g., German wenn ‘when/if)6) as conditional markers (see Traugott et al. 1986). Another common lexical device for forming a conditional is interrogative complementizers/operators, for example English if is also used in embedded yes–no questions.7

The marker on the antecedent does not have to be a single lexical item. It can also be a phrase, as is the case with the English in case and the Spanish con tal que, literally ‘with such that’.

(8) Te perdono con tal que vayas.
    to-you forgive-1s with such that go-SBJV-2s
    ‘I forgive you if you go.’
Languages can also mark the antecedent through inflectional morphology on the verb in the antecedent clause. Examples of such languages include West Greenlandic, Turkish, and Basque.

(9) West Greenlandic  
\[\text{pakasa-anna-rukku pissanganar-niru-vuq}\]  
\[\text{surprise-just-2S.3S.COND be.exciting-more-3S.IND}\]  
‘If you just surprise him, it will be more exciting.’  
(see Fortescue 1984)

The inflection that serves as the overt marker of the antecedent clause need not be unambiguously conditional (i.e., only realized in conditionals). Some languages mark antecedent clauses by using imperative verbs (in the absence of a coordinating conjunction). Consider (10), from Jakab (2005, 302, ex. 2a):

(10) Russian  
\[\text{Znaj ja kakoj-nibud’ inostrannyj jazyk rabotal by know-imper.2SG I some-kind foreign language worked would perevodčikom.}\]  
translator-\textsc{instr}  
‘If I knew some foreign language, I would work as a translator.’  

Morphosyntactically, conditionals like (10) differ from true imperatives in, at least, the absence of subject–verb agreement and the fact that they can be formed from verbs that do not normally appear in the imperative, such as \textit{happen} or \textit{turn out} (see Hacking 1998; Jakab in press, for discussion). The imperative verb, which in imperatives can show number distinction, with forms for 2SG and 2PL, can only be 2SG in its use in this type of conditional.\(^8\)

The use of subjunctive morphology is another common formal device in building conditional antecedents. Consider the following examples from Russian in this respect (from Hacking 1998):

(11) Pročitala by ona etu stat’ju, ona smogla by  
\[\text{read-SG.FEM SUBJ she this-ACC article-ACC she can-SG.FEM SUBJ}\]  
\[\text{overtit’ na vaš vopros.}\]  
answer-\textsc{inf} to your question  
‘Had she read/were she to read the article, she would have been/be able to answer your question.’

Interestingly, when there is no conditional complementizer, as in the above Russian examples, the verb, whether marked as subjunctive or imperative, undergoes movement to C. I-to-C movement is in fact another formal mechanism for forming antecedents of conditionals, often employed by languages in the absence of any other indicator, lexical or morphological, of conditional marking.

In English, I-to-C movement is restricted to the antecedents of counterfactual conditionals (see Iatridou and Embick 1994), and also some future-less-vivid conditionals – that is, conditionals that implicate that if \(p\) is the proposition expressed by the antecedent, \(\neg p\) is more likely than \(p\) (Iatridou 2000 uses the term “future-less-vivid,” which is drawn from grammars of Ancient Greek). In other languages, inversion is less restricted and is available in indicative conditionals as well, as the German example (12c) below illustrates.
(12) a. Had I known, I would not have gone.
b. Were he to come, we would not go.
c. Hast du was, dann bist du was
   ‘If you have something, then you are something.’

The preceding discussion might suggest that the explicit marking of the antecedent is cross-linguistically obligatory. This is not the case. In Bengali (Comrie 1986) and Hindi, for example, it is the presence of the *then* which is obligatory, not the presence of the *if*.

(13) Hindi
(agar) | mehnat karoge to | safal hoge
if hard-work do-FUT.2PL then successful be-FUT.2PL
‘If you work hard, you’ll be successful.’

(see McGregor 1995)

The marker of the apodosis (the main clause) in Bengali and Hindi is clearly of pronominal origin. Comrie (1986) notes that all instances of overt apodosis marking known to him involve particles, often of pronominal origin. He suggests that these may therefore be analyzable as resumptive pronouns.

Finally, there are conditional constructions where no overt marking of any sort seems to be necessary. Mandarin Chinese allows for conditional interpretation in the absence of any overt marking of conditionality, since *rugou* ‘if’ is optional, and so is the pronominal in the consequent clause *jiu* ‘then’:

(14) (rúguŏ) Zhangsan hē jīu, wǒ (jiu) mā tā
if Zhangsan drink wine I then scold him
‘If Zhangsan drinks wine, (then) I will scold him.’

However, Comrie (1986) notes that in the absence of any overt conditional marking, a sentence like (14) is ambiguous between a variety of relations holding between the two clauses (e.g., *if/when/because*).9

In summary, conditionals are formed through a variety of means. They share a basic biclausal structure, with the antecedent adjoined to the main clause, though, as we will see below in the discussion of adnominal conditionals (section 6.1), other adjunction possibilities are also attested. The internal syntax of the antecedent clause involves the CP-domain, where presumably clause-typing features are lexicalized by special complementizers or they trigger verb-movement. A particularly interesting question arises regarding the structure of conditionals: how, in the absence of a specialized marker, such as a conditional complementizer or conditional inflection, can a clausal adjunct receive the interpretation of a conditional? In other words, *rúguŏ* in Mandarin may be posited to carry the relevant features that a semantics for conditionals would need, and that would distinguish an adjunct clause headed by *rúguŏ* from one headed by, for example, *because*. However, given that I-to-C movement in English is clearly not limited to conditionals – that is, it is also found in matrix questions and in certain focus contexts10 – why is it that an adjunct
as in (12a) is interpreted as a conditional rather than as a *because*-clause? Similar facts obtain in other languages besides English, that employ I-to-C movement in conditionals.

### 3 Structural issues

We begin with a discussion of simple conditionals without *then* like *If you open the refrigerator, it won’t explode.* Once these basic cases have been discussed, we will look at conditionals with *then* and the different structural properties of other kinds of conditionals.

A basic observation is that *if*-clauses can be clause-initial or clause-final. To the limited extent to which they can be clause-medial, they must be set off by parenthetical intonation.

(15) a. **Clause initial**
   If you bother him long enough, John will give you five dollars.

b. **Clause final**
   John will give you five dollars if you bother him long enough.

c. **Clause medial**
   John, if you bother him long enough, will give you five dollars.
   *John if you bother him long enough will give you five dollars.

   (Lasersohn 1996, 154–155, exs 3, 4)

We will address two questions concerning the *if*-clause here. First, what is the structural location of the *if*-clause with respect to the main clause, and second, what is the clause-internal syntax of the *if*-clause.

#### 3.1 The position of merger of the *if*-clause

Greenberg (1963, 84) states the following universal concerning the linear order between the antecedent and the consequent clause of a conditional.

**Word Order Universal 14:** In conditional statements, the conditional clause precedes the conclusion as the normal order in all languages.

Comrie (1986) claims that while many languages allow for both clause-initial and clause-final placement of the *if*-clause, there are also rigidly verb-final languages, where the clause-final option is unavailable.$^{11,12}$

Greenberg’s and Comrie’s observations are important, but it should be noted that they are observations about the surface positions of *if*-clauses. Typological tendencies are compatible with *if*-clauses having an origin distinct from their clause-initial surface position. As we will see soon, there is evidence that the clause-initial/clause-final difference reflects a difference in attachment height and that at least some clause-initial *if*-clauses need to be derived via movement from clause-final *if*-clauses.
3.1.1 If-clauses as adverbial clauses

One logically possible analysis of conditional sentences is that the two clauses are coordinated syntactically, with *if* functioning as a “true conjunction,” to borrow a phrase from Jespersen (1956). There have not been explicit syntactic proposals that the antecedent and consequent of conditional sentences are coordinated clauses, as far as we are aware. There are, in fact, important differences between *if* and a coordinator like *and*. Whereas *if*-clauses can appear both sentence-initially and sentence-finally, the same is not true in the case of coordinated structures involving *and/but/or*.

(16) a. Joe will leave and/but/or Mary will stay.
    b. *And/but/or Mary will stay, Joe will leave.

Furthermore *only* and *even* can modify *if*-clauses but not second conjuncts in coordinations.

(17) a. Lee will give you five dollars only/even [if you bother him].
    b. Lee will give you five dollars (*only/*even) [and/but/or Ken will give you ten].

In being able to appear both sentence-initially and sentence-finally, conditional clauses are like other adverbial clauses:

(18) a. I will leave at noon/because you leave.
    b. At noon/because you leave, I will leave.

Clear evidence that sentence-final *if*-clauses are constituents of the VP and therefore VP-adverbials comes from VP deletion and *do so* anaphora. The most conservative interpretation of the data below is that the place-holders refer back to constituents, and therefore that the conditional clauses are constituents of the VP. Hence they are also adverbials (given that they are not nominal arguments).

(19) a. I will leave if you do and John will leave if you do, too.
    b. I will leave if you do and John will *do so* too.

Evidence for the adjuncthood of *if*-clauses also comes from their behavior under *it*-clefting. *if*-clauses can be clefted but not out of a *wh*-island.

(20) a. It is if the student fails that the teacher will fire the TA.
    b. *It is if the student fails that Bill said that the teacher would fire the TA.*
    c. *It is if the student fails that Bill wonders why the teacher will fire the TA.*

(Collins 1989, 61, exs 15a, 15b, 16)

The severity of the violation in (20c) – what used to be analyzed as an ECP rather than a Subjacency violation – suggests that the *if*-clause is an adjunct (given that it is clearly not a subject).
The data involving modification by only and even (see (17)), and VP ellipsis phenomena (see (19)) provide strong evidence against the view that the antecedent and consequent of conditionals are coordinated. They support the view that if-clauses are adverbials, similarly to temporal phrases and clauses. Furthermore, pronominalization by then suggests that if-clauses are adverbials, since their anaphoric reflex – then – is an adverb.

3.1.2 Height of attachment

If sentence-initial if-clauses are in an adjoined position, then they are clearly adjoined to the main clause, as opposed to a constituent inside it. As expected, sentence-initial if-clauses are not c-commanded by the subject of the main clause (see (21b)). Concerning the position of sentence-final if-clauses, there is evidence suggesting that adjunction to the main clause is not involved. (19) showed us that sentence-final if-clauses can be attached to the VP. Condition C judgments show that an if-clause in sentence-final position is c-commanded by the subject of the main clause. Consider example (21). Coreference between she and Mary is prohibited in (21a) but possible in the minimally distinct (21b) and (21c). Given these facts, the if-clause must be adjoined at most as high as I', and if adjunction to a bar-level projection is to be avoided, the if-clause must be merged even lower.

(21) a. *She, yells at Bill if Mary, is hungry.
   b. If Mary, is hungry, she, yells at Bill.
   c. If she, is hungry, Mary, yells at Bill.

A direct object cannot c-command into an if-clause, irrespective of whether it is sentence-initial or sentence-final.

(22) a. Bill visits her, if Mary, is sick.
   b. If Mary, is sick, Bill visits her,.

We have so far concluded that a sentence-final if-clause is adjoined lower than IP but above the VP or at least higher than the object. Further evidence concerning the structural location of the sentence-final if-clause comes from VP-topicalization. We see that while the if-clause can be topicalized with the VP, it does not have to be.

(23) I told Peter to take the dog out if it rains,
   a. … and take the dog out if it rains, he will.
   b. … and take the dog out he will if it rains.

Based on these tests, Iatridou (1991) proposes that sentence-final if-clauses involve VP-adjunction, while sentence-initial if-clauses involve IP-adjunction (or in some cases CP-adjunction, to accommodate sentences like the ones in (24)).

(24) a. If it rains, what shall we do?
   b. If it rains, are we going to leave?
   c. If he is right, what a fool I’ve been!

Saying that sentence-final if-clauses are adjoined to VP underdetermines their actual position. There is evidence from their interaction with negation which suggests that they can be adjoined below or above negation. Sentence-final, but not sentence-initial, if clauses interact scopally with negation.
As indicated by the two continuations provided, (25) is ambiguous between two readings, one where the negation takes scope over the entire conditional (=25a), and another where the negation takes scope only over the main clause (=25b).

(25) Mary doesn’t yell at Bill if she is hungry
    a. … but if she is sleepy. (∼> if)
    b. … since hunger keeps her quiet. (if > ∼)

The ambiguity may be due to LF-raising of the if-clause and scopal interaction with negation. Iatridou argues, however, that the ambiguity is the result of different levels of attachment. Combining VP-topicalization and interaction with negation provides the relevant piece of evidence in favor of Iatridou’s position.

(26) a. [Smile at Bill [if she is hungry]]VP though she [doesn’t tVP]… (∼> if)
    b. [Smile at Bill]VP though she [[doesn’t tVP] if she is hungry.]]… (if > ∼)

The above are unambiguous: in the former negation has scope over the if-clause and in the latter the scopal relations are reversed. This strongly suggests that post-verbal if-clause can adjoin at different sites – above negation and below negation.

3.1.3 A source for sentence-initial if-clauses

A natural question that arises is whether the clause-initial and clause-final positions for if-clauses are related by movement. There is evidence that at least some sentence-initial if-clauses have a source lower than their surface position. This evidence comes from the interpretation of sentences like (27).

(27) a. I think that if you leave I will leave.
    b. If you leave, I think that I will leave.

In (27b), on the most plausible reading, there is no conditional relationship between the hearer’s leaving and the speaker’s thinking about leaving, contrary to what we would expect from the surface form. We can account for this by saying that the if-clause has been preposed from an underlying position within the scope of think, perhaps as in (27a). Of course, this is only evidence, furthermore indirect, of movement of the if-clause from one clause-initial position to another. It may still be the case that clause-initial antecedent clauses are never the result of movement from the VP-adjoined position in which the if-clause may also surface.

To further complicate the picture, along with evidence that certain sentence-initial if-clauses involve fronting from a lower position, there also seems to be evidence that not all sentence-initial if-clauses involve movement. The analysis is complicated by the fact that the if-clause is an adjunct and so its reconstruction is not obligatory (or alternatively, it can be merged countercyclically; see Lebeaux 1990). This can be seen by the absence of a Condition C violation in (28b).

(28) a. ‘She, yells at Bill if Mary, is hungry.
    b. If Mary, is hungry, she, yells at Bill.
Either it is not obligatory (or not possible, assuming late merge) to reconstruct the sentence-initial if-clause to a sentence-final position, or base-generation in a sentence-initial site is also an option.

Iatridou (1991) discusses a number of cases where she argues that reconstruction of the if-clause is obligatory. It should be noted, however, that her tests illustrate that reconstruction is obligatory only to a sentence-initial position. Her facts are silent about whether reconstruction to a sentence-final position is obligatory. The cases where Iatridou argues reconstruction is obligatory are like the ones in (27): the if-clause is construed below the matrix verb.

(29) If it rains, Mary believes/said/heard/assumed that Bill will come.

That these cases involve movement of the if-clause to a sentence-initial position and not base-generation is demonstrated by the fact that the relationship between the if-clause and the clause it is associated with is sensitive to islands.

(30) a. "If it rains Mary regretted/forgot/resented/recognized that Bill will come. factive island  
b. "If it rains Mary didn’t say that Bill will come. negative island  
c. "If it rains Mary heard the rumor that Bill will come. complex NP island  
d. "If it rains Mary wondered whether Bill will come. wh-island

In such cases, reconstruction is obligatory as is shown by the Condition C effect in (31).16

(31) "If John, is sick, he, thinks that Bill will visit.

To derive the Condition C effect in (31), we only need reconstruction to the sentence-initial position in the embedded clause. Reconstruction to the sentence-final position of the embedded clause is not required. In fact there is evidence that reconstruction to the sentence-final position of the embedded clause is not obligatory. This is shown by the possibility of coreference between John and he in (32). Obligatory sentence-final reconstruction would induce a Condition C violation. Thus we can conclude that this is a case where the if-clause was generated clause-initially (below the matrix), and is then preposed to the sentence-initial position.

(32) If John, is sick Mary says that he, should take aspirin.

We have just seen that reconstruction of the if-clause to the sentence-final position is not obligatory. Is there evidence that reconstruction to the sentence-final position is ever possible? Given certain assumptions, it seems that there is. It is reasonable to assume that c-command has to obtain at some point in the derivation prior to spell-out, for anaphoric and variable binding.

In (33a) and (34a), the binder surface c-commands the bindee and a binding relationship is possible. In (33b) and (34b), the binder does not c-command the bindee in overt syntax but a binding relationship is still possible. We can take the possibility of binding as showing there must be a point in the derivation where the sentence-initial if-clause is in the c-command domain of the binder – that is, in the sentence-final VP-adjoined position.
John will be happy if pictures of himself are on sale.
If pictures of himself are on sale, John will be happy.

Every mother is upset if her child is late from school.
If her child is late from school, every mother is upset.

Complications are introduced in (34b), where it seems that the quantifier every mother could scope over the conditional clause and bind a variable in the if-clause at LF. Note, however, that binding achieved in such a way would lead to an illegitimate Weak Crossover configuration.\footnote{The proposal that reconstruction is necessary to receive a bound reading in (33) and (34) receives support from the fact that reconstruction for binding reasons can yield a Condition C violation.}

The proposal that reconstruction is necessary to receive a bound reading in (33) and (34) receives support from the fact that reconstruction for binding reasons can yield a Condition C violation.

Every mother is upset at John if he ignores her child.
∗Every mother is upset at him if John ignores her child.
∗If John ignores her child, every mother is upset at him.

If QR applied to the spell-out of the sentence above, and QR and not reconstruction produced the configuration for variable binding, then we would have no account of why (35c) is ungrammatical. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that reconstruction is necessary to obtain a bound-variable reading.

3.2 Clause-internal syntax of the if-clause

3.2.1 The location of if
It is quite commonly assumed that if is a complementizer. There is indeed evidence that if is within the CP-domain. But it turns out that it is not easy to find conclusive arguments as to it being in C. Furthermore, in some languages the counterpart to if is a wh-pronoun, suggesting that it is an element in SpecCP, at least in these languages.

Let us begin with the arguments that if is within the CP domain. If and when pattern differently than until/before/after with respect to anaphora possibilities.

I will work until Joe leaves and Harry will work until then, too.
∗I will leave when/if Joe leaves and Harry will leave when/if then, too.
(vs. I will leave when/if Joe leaves and Harry will leave then, too.)

We see that it is possible to refer back to the complement of after/before/until with a pronoun but not to the complement/sister constituent of if/when. It is, however, possible to refer to the entire complex – that is, to the if/when together. This situation resembles what we find with questions.

Sean wonders whether Mirwais likes Madonna.
Rob wonders that, too.
∗Rob wonders whether that, too.

The contrast between if/when and until/before/after suggests that the former are either in SpecCP or C\(^0\), while the latter are prepositions that take CP/IPs as complements.
To decide on the location of *if* in the CP domain, researchers have looked at interrogative complements. Kayne (1991) in particular has argued that the conditional *if* and the interrogative *if* are one and the same. If so, we can conjecture that *if* in conditional clauses and in questions occupies the same position.

(38)  
(a) *Lee knows [if [PRO to leave]].*  
(b) Lee knows [whether [PRO to leave]].

Kayne (1991) argues that *if* is in \(C^0\) while *whether* is in SpecCP. The grammaticality contrast between (38a) and (38b) is argued to follow from the respective location of *if* and *whether*. In particular, (38a) is ungrammatical because *if* illicitly governs PRO.\(^{18}\)

The explanation for the contrast in (38) is in need of reconsideration, however. Note that in English, *if* can take participial complements.

(39)  
(a) If elected, he has said that he will seek to renegotiate much of the country’s foreign debt.  
(b) If convicted on all counts, the individuals could be imprisoned for as long as five years and fined $250,000 each.  

(from the *Wall Street Journal* corpus)

Presumably *elected* and *convicted* have PRO subjects. It is not clear why government by *if* does not render these illegitimate. Furthermore, given minimalist aspirations to eliminate the notion of government from the theoretical apparatus, and given alternative accounts for the distribution of PRO based on case (see Lasnik 1995, among others), the distinction in grammaticality in (38) may not be used to argue for a different syntactic location of *if* and *whether*.

The proposal that *if* is in \(C^0\) receives some support from the complementary distribution of *if* and conditional inversion.

(40)  
(a) If John had eaten the calamari, he would have been better now.  
(b) Had John eaten the calamari, he would have been better now.  

(Iatridou and Embick 1994, exs 1a, 1b)

When conditional inversion takes place, an *if* may not be present. Pesetsky (1989) and Iatridou and Embick (1994) propose that conditional inversion involves I-to-C movement. The complementary distribution of *if* and conditional inversion and the analysis of conditional inversion as movement to \(C^0\) suggests that *if* is in \(C^0\).

On the analysis of *if* as a complementizer, the fact that its presence blocks conditional inversion may thus receive the same explanation as the root-embedded asymmetry with respect to V2 in languages such as German and Dutch. In these languages, when the complementizer is present the finite verb does not raise to C, but in main clauses, and in complements of certain verbs when there is no complementizer present, I-to-C movement obtains.\(^{19}\) Note, however, that the complementarity between conditional inversion and the presence of a CP-related element is seen in German as well. Yet in German, *wenn* ‘if, when’ does not appear to have a different location whether it functions as a conditional marker or a relative
Thus, the complementarity of *if* and conditional inversion is also not a conclusive argument in favor of *if* being a complementizer. We have to conclude that there is suggestive but not conclusive evidence in favor of analyzing *if* in conditionals as a complementizer. Fortunately, not much hinges on this particular point. Conditional C\(^0\) will have to have certain features, distinguishing it from other types of clauses, and whether *if* lexicalizes these features, or enters into a checking relationship in a Spec–Head agreement with them, is of a relatively lesser importance. Furthermore, languages likely differ in this respect. Languages where the counterpart of *if* is a *wh*-related pronoun would merge it as a specifier of CP, possibly after extraction from within the clause (on that see further below), while other languages would merge the counterpart of *if* as a C\(^0\).

### 3.2.2 The conditional–interrogative link

As noted above, Kayne (1991) has proposed that conditional and interrogative *if* are the same element. Presumably what is meant is that the featural content of *if* is the same whether it appears in a conditional clause or in an interrogative clause. This is in fact a phenomenon wider than English. For instance, in Bulgarian one of the ways to form a conditional clause is to use the interrogative complementizer *li*.

\[
(41) \quad \text{a. Znae li anglijski, šte go vzemat na rabota.} \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{know-3SG Q English will him take to work} \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{‘If he knows English they will hire him.’} \\
\quad \text{b. (Čudja se) znae li anglijski} \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{wonder-1SG REFL know-3SG Q English} \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{‘I wonder whether he knows English/Does he know English?’}
\]

Similarly, antecedent clauses in Mandarin Chinese *dou*-conditionals have been analyzed by Cheng and Huang (1996) as interrogative clauses, showing that the parallels between conditionals and questions extend beyond the use of identical complementizers.

Furthermore, arguably, I-to-C movement is another formal instantiation of the close structural parallels between conditionals and questions. As Iatridou and Embick (1994) have pointed out, languages that exhibit I-to-C movement in conditionals also have I-to-C movement in questions. The facts of *if*/-*li*- use in questions and conditionals and the facts of conditional inversion can then be unified under the following generalization:

\[
(42) \quad \text{Interrogative adjunct clauses are interpreted as conditionals.}
\]

A similar conclusion is reached on independent grounds in Izvorski (2001). It is argued there that free relative clauses used as free adjuncts (see (43)) depend for their interpretation on the following factors (in addition to some others): (i) having the structure and semantics of questions, and (ii) conditional interpretation being available to clausal adjuncts. See also the chapter on Free Relatives for discussion.

\[
(43) \quad \text{Whatever Bill says, Mary will quit her job.}
\]

Further elaboration on the link between conditionals and questions comes from Larson’s (1985) suggestion of a covert operator in the SpecCP of conditional and
interrogative *if*-clauses. Larson (1985) posits that in interrogative *if*-clauses there is a covert *whether* marking the scope of covert *or*. This covert *whether* is what makes *if*-interrogatives into *wh*-islands. It is the case that extraction of complements is degraded out of embedded yes–no questions, while the extraction of adjuncts and subjects is impossible:

(44)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Who did you wonder if/whether Mary saw?} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Who did you wonder if/whether saw Mary?} \\
\text{c. } & \text{How/when did you wonder if/whether Mary fixed the car?}
\end{align*}

By Larson’s proposal, the difference between interrogative and conditional *if*-clauses extends beyond their attachment site. Larson has a covert *whether* in the SpecCP of an *if*-clause as well. (Conditional clauses, being adjuncts, are of course strong islands.)

We believe something like Larson’s proposal to be on the right track. Arguably, conditional *if*-clauses have a structure, and correspondingly, aspects of interpretation, similar to that of questions, including the presence of an operator in SpecCP. Yet ultimately, conditionals and questions diverge in interpretation. Conditionals receive the interpretation of free relatives – that is, of definite expressions. Thus, there is indeed a link between conditionals and questions but this link is indirect, derivative of the link between free relatives and questions. Parallels between *if*- and temporal *when*-clauses have prompted Geis (1985) to argue that conditionals are species of relative clauses. Our proposal is a further step in this direction, arguing for an isomorphism between conditionals and free relatives.

Let us consider the relation between conditionals/free relatives and questions in some detail. *Wh*-questions and free relatives have a common structure (see (45a)). Some of the features in $C^0$ are common as well (presumably the one(s) triggering *wh*-movement), which accounts for common syncretisms across languages between questions and free relatives. Some of the features in $C^0$ are different, which leads to questions and free relatives being interpreted differently. Questions are interpreted as sets of propositions where the variable abstracted over (as a result of *wh*-movement) has been existentially quantified (e.g., Hamblin 1973; Karttunen 1977) (see the simplified (45b)). Free relatives are interpreted as definite descriptions – that is, with the variable abstracted over being bound by a definite operator (e.g., Jacobson 1995, among others) (see (45c)).

(45)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{LF: } \text{wh}_x C^0 \text{John bought } x \\
\text{b. } & \text{\( \lambda p[p=\exists x[\text{John bought } x]] \)} \\
\text{c. } & \text{\( \iota x[\text{John bought } x] \)}
\end{align*}

Turning to conditionals, our proposal that they are interpreted as free relatives amounts to the claim that they are definite descriptions of possible worlds. The structure yielding this interpretation is analogous to the one in (45a) in all the relevant respects.

(46)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{LF: Op}_w C^0 \text{John arrives late in } w \\
\text{b. } & \text{\( nw[\text{John arrives late in } w] \)}
\end{align*}
Conditionals involve abstraction over a possible world variable. The null operator in SpecCP of if-clauses, and likely the when itself in, for example, German conditionals, is a definite binder of the possible world variable.

Schein (2001) argues on independent grounds that if-clauses are plural definite descriptions of events. Similarly, that conditionals are interpreted as definite descriptions of possible worlds has recently been independently proposed by Schlenker (2004). Within a general program of semantic uniformity (see Schlenker 1999; 2001), he analyzes if as the counterpart of the applied to a description of possible worlds rather than of individuals. Thus if \( p \) denotes the closest \( p \)-worlds, whereas the \( P \) denotes the most salient \( P \)-individual. Schlenker points out that if-clauses, like definites, may be topicalized; that they may be coreferential with a world pronoun then, the way definites may be coreferential with individual pronouns; and that they may give rise to Condition C effects in certain structural configurations, just like definites can. We will return to Schlenker’s proposal below (section 4.2.1), when we discuss in more detail conditionals with then and the parallels with correlatives.

We are now in a position to give an explanation for the conditional–interrogative link, to an extent that has not been previously achieved. The fact that if functions in many languages as both a conditional and an interrogative complementizer makes sense within the general proposal that conditionals are free relative clauses. In English, and in many other languages, this syncretism would be part of a more general structural parallelism between questions and free relatives in these languages.

3.2.3 The absence of low construals

The parallel between conditional clauses and free relatives suggested above is apparently challenged by certain facts, first noticed by Geis (1970). These facts led him to conclude in fact that conditionals should be given a distinct analysis from relative clauses, a position which he reversed in Geis (1985). Geis (1970; 1985) noted that whereas when-clauses are ambiguous as per extraction sites of the relative pronoun, if-clauses are not. Conditional statements employing overt headed relatives are ambiguous. We can further observe that conditionals formed with in case and conditionals formed with I-to-C movement are also not ambiguous and only allow for high construals.

\[ (47) \]

\[ a. \quad \text{I will leave when you say you'll do.} \]
\[ \text{High construal: I will leave at time } t \text{ such that at time } t, \text{ you say that you'll leave (at time } t'). \]
\[ \text{Low construal: I will leave at time } t. \text{ You said that you would leave at time } t. \]

\[ b. \quad \text{I will leave if you say you will do.} \]
\[ \text{High construal: In situations } s, \text{ you say you'll leave (in situations } s'). \text{ In those situations } s, \text{ I will leave.} \]
\[ \text{Low construal: You say that in situations } s, \text{ you'll leave. In those situations } s, \text{ I will leave.} \]

\[ c. \quad \text{I will leave in any circumstance in which you say you'll leave.} \]
\[ \text{High construal: In situations } s, \text{ you say you'll leave (in situations } s'). \text{ In those situations } s, \text{ I will leave.} \]
\[ \text{Low construal: You say that in situations } s, \text{ you'll leave. In those situations } s, \text{ I will leave.} \]
(48)  a. I will leave in case you say you’ll leave.  
    b. Had he said he would leave, I would have left.  
    high construal only

The ambiguity in (47a) and (47c) arises due to two possible sources for the adjunct phrase that undergoes A’-movement: when in (47a) and in which circumstances in (47c). The lack of low construals in if-clauses suggests that if-clauses do not involve A’-movement of a covert adjunct.

One response would be to say, as Iatridou (1991) does, that if-clauses do not involve A’-movement. If this is the case, if-clauses would be perhaps more akin to reduced relatives where only the top-level argument can be abstracted over. Other than this difference, conditional constructions would be like free relatives constructions. Still, we think that the explanation lies elsewhere.21

In lacking low construals, if-clauses resemble because and causal since-clauses. Because and since are sentential functions and not quantifiers – that is, they do not bind positions inside their clause. Thus in (49), my leaving has to be due to John’s writing and not to Mary’s leaving. In other words, it cannot be for the reason $r$ such that John wrote that Mary left for reason $r$.

(49)  I left because/since John wrote that Mary left.

This point can be made even sharper by abstracting away from the question of matrix versus embedded extraction and corresponding ambiguities. The complement of because/since in (50a) gives the reason for Mary’s leaving. This is not the case with (50b), where it is stated that the two events have the same cause.

(50)  a. Mary left because/since the bell rang.  
    reason for Mary’s leaving = the bell ringing  
    b. Mary left for the reason for which the bell rang.  
    reason for Mary’s leaving = reason for the bell’s ringing

Unlike the case of because and since clauses, however, judgments are not as clear-cut with if-clauses. Thus Iatridou (1991) suggests that it is not in fact obvious whether in (51) if has a construal like that in (50b) – that is, whether we have ‘John will leave in any circumstance in which Peter calls Mary’ or ‘John will leave under the condition that Peter calls Mary’. The latter involves no variable binding in the if-clause.

(51)  John will leave if Peter calls Mary.

Non-local construals are blocked by stipulating that if-clauses do not involve A’-movement. However, such a proposal seems less attractive for languages like German where the equivalent of if is wenn, which also appears in when-clauses. There seems to be no evidence to suggest that the syntactic behavior of wenn is different in conditional and in temporal clauses – that is, it does undergo A’-movement in both cases. However, the locality effects seen in English conditionals are also found in German. When wenn is interpreted as a temporal pronoun it allows low construals; when it is interpreted as a conditional marker, it only allows high construals. So perhaps the explanation is not to be sought in the absence of a null operator, and corresponding absence of A’-movement in conditionals, but in the kind of variable that is being abstracted over.
Thus we believe that while if-clauses do not have low construals, they do in fact involve binding. Simplifying grossly, what is said in section 3.2.3 is that the situations of Peter calling Mary all extend to situations of John leaving. So we do have a situation/world variable which is abstracted over. What is special about conditionals is that we can only abstract over the situation/world variable of the highest predicate. That perhaps situation/world variables only allow local abstraction has been suggested by Heim (p.c., to Iatridou 1991). Hence local A'-movement would proceed unconstrained. But if A'-movement creates a long-distance chain involving a situation/world variable, such a chain would be ruled out on independent grounds which remain to be explicated. More fully worked-out proposals that explain the absence of low construals can be found in Citko (2000) and Haegeman (2010).

3.2.4 Conditional inversion

Forming conditionals through I-to-C movement is a cross-linguistically attested phenomenon. Based on a survey of several Romance, Germanic, Slavic languages, and Greek, Iatridou and Embick (1994) make several observations regarding conditional inversion.

First, it appears to be the case that languages which exhibit conditional inversion also have inversion in questions. We are now in a position to account for this generalization. We could assume that V1 antecedents are interrogative clauses, and that they are interpreted as conditional in conformity with the principle in (42), which states that interrogative adjunct clauses are interpreted as conditionals. If V1 antecedents are structurally questions, then it follows that languages which have conditional inversion will have I-to-C movement in questions.

Second, Iatridou and Embick observe that V1 tensed adjunct clauses (i.e., clauses where I-to-C movement has occurred) are always interpreted as conditional and never as, for example, because-clauses. This is an important generalization which we are now in a position to reduce to the principle in (42). This generalization follows from our assumption above that V1 adjuncts are interrogative clauses and from the principle that interrogative adjuncts are interpreted as conditionals (see (42)).

Third, Iatridou and Embick point out that V1 conditional clauses may not be focused. In particular, they show that V1 antecedents may not be the associates of focus adverbs like only and even and of constituent negation; that they may not be clefted; and that they may not be used as answers to questions. The sentences below illustrate these findings.

(52) a. *Only had I thought that he was sick would I have called him.
b. Only if I had thought that he was sick would I have called him.

(53) a. ??Even had Joe served truffles Kathy would not have been happy.
b. Even if Joe had served truffles Kathy would not have been happy.

(54) a. *It is had John come that Mary would have left.
b. It is if John had come that Mary would have left.

(55) Under what circumstances would Mary have come?
a. #Had she been offered many artichokes.
b. If she had been offered many artichokes.
Iatridou and Embick propose that the truth-value of the proposition expressed by a V1 conditional has to be discourse-old – that is, there is a requirement not just that the proposition has been under discussion but that also its truth-value is known. This raises some issues with respect to indicative conditionals. If Iatridou and Embick’s suggestion is on the right track, the requirement that the truth value of the proposition expressed by a V1 conditional be known, may be the reason why conditional inversion is so restricted in indicative conditionals, given that indicative conditionals do not come with the presupposition or implicature that the truth-value of their antecedent is known. Yet some languages allow conditional inversion in indicative conditionals (e.g., the German examples (12c) and (59c) below). It remains an open question how the discourse-old requirement is to apply to cases like these.24

One possibility to explore is that the inability of V1 conditional antecedents to be focused may be derived from their syntactic position. In the discussion of sentence-initial and sentence-final if-clauses above we noted that some sentence-initial antecedents are moved from a lower position in the clause, whereas some have to be analyzed as having been base-generated as clausal adjuncts. Later we will see evidence for the relation between conditionals and correlative structures. As a preview, correlative adjuncts are base-generated outside of the clause and are coindexed with a proform (in the case of conditionals the proform is then). As a result of this structure, correlative clauses may not be focused. If V1 conditional antecedents are in fact base-generated in a correlative structure, then it will follow that they should not be able to be focused.

The tests for base-generation of the V1 antecedent clause, however, are not conclusive. The absence of Condition C effects with sentence-initial V1 conditionals is in conformity with a proposal that suggests that such antecedents are generated in a clause-adjointed position and not moved there. Yet of course, there is the possibility that V1 antecedents are generated in a lower position but reconstruction is not forced, given that they are adjuncts.

(56) a. Had Mary, been hungry, she, would have yelled at Bill.
b. *She, would have yelled at Bill had Mary, been hungry.
c. Mary, would have yelled at Bill had she, been hungry.

When reconstruction is forced for the purposes of variable binding the following paradigm obtains:

(57) a. Had pictures of himself, been on sale, John, would have been happy.
b. Had John ignored her, child, every mother, would have been upset.

(58) a. *Had John, ignored her, child, every mother, would have been upset at him.
b. *Every mother, would have been upset at him, had John, ignored her, child.
c. Every mother, would have been upset at John, had he, ignored her, child.

The examples above show that V1 conditionals are apparently able to reconstruct to a lower position, for the purposes of variable binding. If V1 clauses were not able to reconstruct, presumably the examples in (57) would have been ungrammatical.
Condition C effects obtain, as (58a) shows, indicating that indeed reconstruction is forced for variable binding. Thus, unfortunately, we cannot reach a conclusion with respect to Iatridou and Embick’s generalization regarding the impossibility to focus a V1 conditional antecedent.

Finally, Iatridou and Embick point out that inversion in counterfactual conditionals is more widely attested than inversion in indicative conditionals – that is, if a language allows inversion in indicatives it will also allow it in counterfactuals, whether the conditional clause is sentence-initial or sentence-final. German is an example of a language where sentence-initial V1 conditional antecedents may be either indicative or counterfactual, but sentence-final ones may only be counterfactual.

(59) a. Susanne wäre abgefahren, wäre Hans gekommen.
   Susanne would-have left had Hans come
   ‘Susanne would have left if Hans had come.’

   b. *Susanne geht, kommt Hans.
   Susanne goes comes Hans
   ‘Susanne goes if Hans comes.’

   c. Kommt Hans, dann geht Susanne.
   comes Hans then goes Susanne
   ‘If Hans comes then Susanne goes.’

   (Iatridou and Embick 1994, 190, exs 5, 6, 2b)

In English, as mentioned earlier, counterfactual and future-less-vivid conditionals allow inversion, but indicative conditionals disallow it. The facts are the same in sentence-final conditional clauses.

(60) a. Had he come, we would not have gone.

   b. Were he to come, we would not go.

   c. Should he come, we would not go.

   d. *Does he come, we will not go.

   e. *Is he coming, we will not go.

Unlike the two generalizations which we were able to reduce to a single principle, on the assumption that V1 clauses are syntactically questions, this generalization turns out to be harder to explain. It is not clear why counterfactuals (and future-less-vivid conditionals) should more easily allow conditional inversion than indicative conditionals. Perhaps we should rephrase the question and refer to the principle in (42). It may be the case that some languages place restrictions on the kind of interrogative clauses in adjunct position that may be interpreted as conditional. Clearly, more research into this question is necessary.

It is interesting to further note that V1 and non-inverted counterfactual conditionals differ with respect to the implicature of counterfactuality. As often observed (e.g., Stalnaker 1975; Karttunen and Peters 1979; Palmer 1986) countefactuality in conditionals is implicated, not asserted. The example given to illustrate this is as follows:

(61) If the patient had the measles, he would have exactly the symptoms he has now.

   We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
This examples shows that although a counterfactual conditional does convey that the proposition expressed by the antecedent is false, this inference is an implicature because it is cancellable. Similarly, one can assert the falsity of the proposition expressed by the antecedent without redundancy:

(62) If the butler had done it, we would have found blood on the kitchen knife. The knife was clean, therefore the butler did not do it.

Interestingly, Iatridou and Embick (1994) point out that in V1 conditionals the counterfactuality inference cannot be cancelled. Consider the contrast in the examples below (from Iatridou and Embick 1994, 201, ex. 46a, 46b):

(63)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. If he had broken his leg in his childhood, which, in fact, he did, he would have exactly this type of scar.
  \item b. #Had he broken his leg in his childhood, which, in fact, he did, he would have exactly this type of scar.
\end{itemize}

Iatridou and Embick make the conjecture that the discourse-old status of the proposition expressed by a V1 conditional is responsible for the non-cancellability of the counterfactuality inference.

4 The conditional–correlative link

Correlative constructions involve a free relative clause adjoined to the matrix clause and coindexed with a proform inside it (see Srivastav 1991; Dayal 1996, among others).

(64) \[
\text{[free relative], [... proform,...]}
\]

In many languages conditionals are correlative structures themselves or are historically derived from correlative constructions. The if-clause is the correlative clause, and then is a correlative proform. Our proposal that if-clauses are free relatives – that is, definite descriptions of possible worlds – naturally predicts that they should be able to appear in the correlative construction.

Geis (1985), Von Fintel (1994), and Izvorski (1997) among others have suggested that conditional constructions are related to correlatives. Geis was perhaps the first to note that conditionals constructions in English are the remnants of a strategy of correlativization that was once more productive in the language.

Treating some conditionals as correlatives helps us to understand several aspects of the behavior of conditionals cross-linguistically. In languages where correlativization is a productive strategy, it is apparent that conditionals are correlatives (e.g., Marathi).

(65) a. \[(dzar)\] tyāne abhyās kelā tar to pā hol
   \text{if he-} \text{AG studying do.} \text{PST.3MSG then he pass be.} \text{FUT.3s}
   ‘If he studies, he will pass (the exam).’
b. *dzo māṇūs tuḍzhīyā ședzārī rāhto to māṇūs lekhak āhe*
   which man your neighborhood-in live-prs.3msg that man writer is
   (Lit. ‘The man who lives in your neighborhood is a writer.’)
   (Lit. ‘Which man lives in your neighborhood, that man is a writer.’)

In addition, treating conditionals as correlatives helps to explain facts concerning
the semantic contribution of *then* (section 4.1), the syntax of conditionals with *then*
(section 4.2), and constraints on stacked *if*-clauses (section 4.2). There are also some
challenges that need to be faced by a theory that treats conditionals as correlatives
and these are discussed in section 4.3.

### 4.1 *Then* as a correlative proform

One of the arguments for treating conditionals as correlatives is the existence of *then*
which is plausibly analyzed as the correlative proform corresponding to the *if*
clause. Treating *then* as a correlative proform is advantageous because we are able
to provide a very general analysis of its syntax and semantics. Its semantic prop-
erties turn out to be properties shared by correlative proforms, and its syntactic prop-
erties turn out to be shared by correlative constructions more generally. Here we
review a few properties of *then* and how they are part of the larger picture of
correlative constructions.

#### 4.1.1 The semantic contribution of *then*

Conditional *then* appears to have hardly any interpretive contribution. Its presence
in conditionals is not required (except in reduced conditionals; see below,
section 6.2), and the difference in meaning between *if p, q* and *if p, then q* is not obvi-
ous. For this reason, in semantic discussions *then* is usually either treated as part of a
discontinuous logical connective *if… then* or is simply ignored. Iatridou (1991; 1994)
challenges the view that conditional *then* is semantically vacuous. She proposes that
*then* is associated with a particular presupposition; when this presupposition is
incompatible with the meaning of the conditional, the appearance of *then* is
precluded.

Specifically, Iatridou proposes that a statement of the type *if p, then q* has the asser-
tion of a conditional without *then*, and that, in addition, *then* contributes the presup-
position that at least some of the ¬p-cases are ¬q-cases.

To illustrate with an example, the conditional in (66) asserts (66a) and presup-
poses (66b):

(66) *If Stefan is happy, then he sings in the shower.*

a. In every case in which Stefan is happy, he sings in the shower.

b. Not in every case in which Stefan is not happy does he sing in the shower.

The presupposition in (66b) is in effect a statement that there is some case in which
Stefan is not happy and he does not sing in the shower. Thus (66) cannot be felici-
tously uttered if the speaker wants to convey that Stefan always sings in the
shower, happy or not.
The interpretative contribution of conditional *then* is discussed in Von Fintel (1994) as well. Von Fintel assumes Iatridou’s proposal about the meaning of *then* but also differs from her in one respect. For him the use of *then* triggers a (conventional) implicature that alternatives to the antecedent (all $\neg p$ cases) do not satisfy the matrix proposition.

The meaning contribution of conditional *then* is of particular interest here, because Izvorski (1996) shows that correlative proforms behave quite similarly to conditional *then*. In particular, Izvorski proposes that, given a choice between structures like (67a) (a correlative) and (67b) (a free relative in argument or adjunct position inside the clause – i.e., non-dislocated free relative), the structure with the proform is associated with a presupposition that alternatives to the free relative do not make the main clause true.25

\[(67) \quad \text{a. } [\text{CP } [\text{free relative}], \text{CP} \ldots \text{proform}, \ldots]\]
\[\text{b. } [\text{CP} \ldots \text{free relative}]]\]

Thus, we see that there are good reasons to treat conditional *then* as an anaphoric element of the correlative proform type.

Next, we briefly examine several cases where *then* is unacceptable. The examples fall into two categories; namely *then* is not felicitous (i) when the consequent of the conditional is asserted and (ii) when the consequent presupposes the antecedent.

The set of examples in (68)–(70) illustrate the case of the asserted consequent. If the antecedent explicitly exhausts all possibilities (as in (68a)), is the associate of *even* (as in (68b)),26 or is scalarly exhaustive (as in (68c) and (68d)), *then* is precluded.

\[(68) \quad \text{a. } \text{If John is dead or alive, (#then) Bill will find him.}\]
\[(\text{Iatridou 1993–1994, 174, ex. 6})\]
\[\text{b. } \text{Even if John is drunk, (#then) Bill will vote for him.}\]
\[(\text{Iatridou 1993–1994, 174, ex. 10})\]
\[\text{c. } \text{If I were the richest linguist on earth, (#then) I (still) wouldn’t be able to afford this house.}\]
\[(\text{Iatridou 1993–1994, 176, ex. 14})\]
\[\text{d. } \text{If he were to wear an Armani suit, (#then) she (still) wouldn’t like him.}\]
\[(\text{Iatridou 1991})\]

Consider (68a). Because the predicate *dead or alive* does not allow for alternatives (i.e., John is necessarily dead or alive), the conditional asserts that Bill will find John. Predictably, *then* is not acceptable. Similarly, in (68b), the conditional without *then* asserts that Bill will vote for John under any circumstances. As in the previous case, the antecedent is exhaustive: the use of *even* is associated with universal quantification over a scale; the associate of *even* marks an end point on the scale and the proposition is taken to hold for all other alternatives to the associate on the scale (see Horn 1969; Fauconnier 1975; Karttunen and Peters 1979; Rooth 1985). The appearance of *then* brings about the presupposition that in some state of affairs Bill will not vote for John, which clearly clashes with the assertions of the sentence. Therefore, *then* is unacceptable in *even if* conditionals. Yet another way to have an exhaustive antecedent is to use a superlative or pragmatically determined end point of a scale (see Fauconnier 1975). These cases are completely analogous to *even if* conditionals and *then* behaves in a similar fashion, as (68c) and (68d) show.
Related to the above cases is the observation in Von Fintel (1994) that unless conditionals also prohibit the use of then. This fact is illustrated in (69) (from Von Fintel 1994, 96):

(69) Unless it rains tomorrow, (#then) I won’t leave.

The behavior of unless conditionals with respect to then is predicted by Iatridou’s proposal in combination with Von Fintel’s analysis of the semantics of unless clauses. Von Fintel proposes that unless is an exceptive operator on the restrictive clause of conditionals. Assuming the Lewis–Kratzer (see Lewis 1975; Kratzer 1986) approach to conditionals, unless $p$, $q$ receives a semantic representation $Op\ [except\ p]\ [q]$ – that is, (69) is interpreted roughly as All cases, except the ones in which it rains tomorrow, are cases in which I won’t leave. Under the approach pursued by Von Fintel unless $p$, $q$ is paraphrasable as except if $p$, $q$ and it asserts that for all the alternatives to $p$, $q$ holds. Since the presupposition associated with then requires at least some of the $\neg p$ cases to be $\neg q$ cases, clearly then is expected to be disallowed in an unless conditional.

Finally, relevance conditionals also prohibit then. Their antecedent does not form the restrictive clause of an operator (in a Lewis–Kratzer-style approach), but rather presents the conditions under which the information provided by the consequent would be relevant. Since the consequent in relevance conditionals is always asserted, the unacceptability of then is to be expected:

(70) If you are thirsty, (#then) there’s beer in the fridge.

In (70) then would bring about the meaning that at least in some situations in which the hearer is not thirsty, there will not be beer in the fridge, which contradicts the assertion of the sentence.

The second set of cases in which then cannot appear in conditionals is when the antecedent is a presupposition of the consequent. Consider (71a) and (71b) (from Iatridou 1994, 177, exs 19b, 21a):

(71) a. If [there are clouds in the sky], (#then) it puts her in a good mood.
   b. If Mary bakes [a cake], (#then) she gives some slices of it to John.

In (71a), in order for the consequent to be evaluated, it has to have a referent and therefore the antecedent should be true – that is, the cases considered should be the cases in which there are clouds in the sky. However, the presupposition contributed by then is exactly that in some alternatives to the antecedent – that is, situations where there are no clouds in the sky – the consequent is false. But to evaluate situations where there are no clouds in the sky would mean that it would no longer have its original referent. Thus predictably, then is not permitted in (71a). In (71b) the consequent also has to presuppose the truth of the antecedent for the licensing of anaphora. Since in (71b) it refers to the cake baked by Mary, it requires the truth of the antecedent for establishing its reference. The use of then on the other hand requires evaluating, at least in some cases where the antecedent doesn’t hold, thus preventing felicitous anaphora.
In discussing the environments that prohibit the use of conditional then, Iatridou (1994) identifies a problematic case: only if conditionals are compatible with the presupposition of then, yet they disallow it:

(72) #Only if it is sunny ("then") will I visit you.27

Only if conditionals are expected to permit then because their assertion in fact strengthens the presupposition introduced by then. Whereas the appearance of then requires that some of the ¬p cases be ¬q cases, the only if conditional asserts that none of the alternatives to p satisfies q – that is, that all ¬p cases are ¬q cases. The clash between only and then, then, is a puzzle. And, of course, only is not inherently incompatible with conditional then. When only takes then as its associate, rather than the antecedent clause, the sentences are grammatical.

(73) If he comes only then will she leave.

The solution to this problem cannot be quite as straightforward as the suggestion that only is a quantificational element and cannot be left-dislocated, together with its antecedent, on analogy with everyone/someone in the case of left-dislocation in (74):

(74) *Everyonei/someonei, Mary likes himi.

The reasons for this are several. First, treating only as a dyadic quantifier taking the antecedent and the consequent clause of conditionals as its arguments is problematic. Instead, as shown by Von Fintel (1997), only is better analyzed as an operator on propositions. If so, constraints against left dislocation of only and the if-clause are harder to formulate, as the two do not form a constituent.

A second problem, as Iatridou points out, is that the discussion about then is situated within a semantic theory of conditionals that takes any conditional to be a quantificational construct, with the if-clause restricting an overt or covert operator. But then, then is expected to be always precluded, as in its presence the if-clause must be left-dislocated. We cannot simultaneously hold that the #only if... then problem is due to the fact that left-dislocated clauses do not make good restrictors of quantificational operators, and still analyze if p then q conditionals as quantificational constructions.

A solution to the #only if... then problem has been suggested in Izvorski (1997). She proposes that the relevant factor in the behavior of proforms in the presence of only is a clash in the requirements of focus: the associate of only needs to be focused, yet the antecedent in the correlative construction cannot be focused.

4.1.2 The distribution of then

The proform then may be present without an overt if-clause.

(75) A: John might come.
    B: Well, then I will leave.

However, with an overt if-clause, then may appear only if the if-clause is sentence-initial.
(76)  a. If John leaves, I will come home.
b. If John leaves, then I will come home.

(77)  a. I will come home if John leaves.
b. "Then I will come home, if John leaves.

More generally, an overt if-clause needs to be structurally adjacent to the then-clause with which it is associated.

(78)  a. If it rains, then I think that we should stay at home.
b. "If it rains I think that then we should stay at home.

(Izvorski 1996, ex. 29; also see Collins 1989)

Correlative proforms can, in general, stand by themselves. Cross-linguistically they tend to be drawn from the class of demonstrative pronouns and in the absence of a correlative clause to restrict what they pick out, they just behave like ordinary demonstratives. This is why then can appear by itself (see (75)). The relationship between a correlative proform and the correlative clause involves binding and thus requires c-command. (77b) is ungrammatical because the correlative clause (= the if-clause) does not c-command the correlative proform. In addition to the c-command requirement, there is also a locality requirement that holds between the correlative clause and correlative proform. There are different ways of stating this requirement but the intuition is that the surface location of the then marks a predicate that combines with the if-clause. Thus the if-clause and the then must be structurally adjacent. (78b) is ungrammatical due to the failure of structural adjacency.

The assimilation of conditionals with correlatives also helps us to explain the distribution of then in stacked if-clauses. As discussed earlier, the presence of then in a conditional is not obligatory. However, if more than one if-clause is present, then only the most deeply embedded then may be omitted. All others must be present.

(79)  If you are back before eight, *(then) if the roast is ready, *(then) if we are both hungry, (then) we will have dinner together.

(based on Kratzer 1986, ex. 7)

These facts are reminiscent of facts concerning stacked relative clauses discussed by Jacobson (1983), who noted that when more than one relative clause modifies a DP all but the innermost relative clause must have overt material in its COMP domain – that is, there must be an overt relative operator or an overt relative complementizer.

(80)  every man (who/that) I like *(who/that) I invited

However, it is not plausible to analyze then as a relative pronoun. For one, it is the if-clause that we have analyzed as a free relative. It is well known that correlatives, unlike headed relative clauses, do not allow stacking. This falls out naturally from the semantics of correlatives which involve variable binding. Once a correlative clause binds a correlative proform, that correlative proform cannot
be bound by another correlative clause. In contrast, headed relative clauses combine with the head they modify by set-intersection which imposes no such limitation. It is plausible that the requirement for overt then has a similar source. The lowest if-clause can combine directly with the main clause and hence it does not require a then. The higher if-clause cannot combine directly with the main clause because there is only one position for an if-clause and it is already occupied by the lowest if-clause. Any further modification requires an overt then which is bound by the next highest if-clause. A then can only be bound by its immediately superior if-clause. Therefore all but the lowest if-clauses need to appear with an overt then. According to this analysis there are never any truly stacked if-clauses.

4.2 Structure for conditionals with then

Collins (1989) and Iatridou (1991) have noted that there is a contrast between extraction from the main clause of a conditional with then and from a conditional without then. Extraction out of consequents of conditionals is degraded, but extraction out of the consequents of conditionals which have then is perceived to be worse.

(81) **Clefting**
   a. ?It is the TA that if the student does poorly, the teacher will fire.
   b. ?*It is the TA that if the student does poorly, then the teacher will fire.
      (Collins 1989)

(82) **Question formation**
   a. ?Which TA did John say that if the student does poorly, the teacher would fire?
   b. ?*Which TA did John say that if the student does poorly, then the teacher would fire?
      (Collins 1989)

It is possible to cleft if-clauses. However, clefting of the if-clause is blocked in the presence of then.

(83) a. It is if Bill comes home that Mary will leave.
   b. *It is if Bill comes home that then Mary will leave.
      (Collins 1989)

(84) a. It is if Bill comes home that John said (that) Mary would leave.
   b. *It is if Bill comes home that John said (that) then Mary would leave.
      (Collins 1989)

Finally, the presence of then blocks adjunct extractions.

(85) a. How did John say that Bill would fix the car if Mary brought the tools?
   b. *How did John say that if Mary brought the tools, Bill would fix the car?
   c. *How did John say that if Mary brought the tools, then Bill would fix the car?
      (Collins 1989)
Iatridou (1991) and Collins (1989) propose structures which reflect the fact that extraction from conditionals with *then* is degraded. We have already seen that sentence-initial *if*-clauses without *then* can be handled as involving IP/CP adjunction and that sentence-final *if*-clauses involve VP-adjunction. The basic intuition that Iatridou and Collins’ structures capture is that conditionals with *then* involve additional structure which provides an extra barrier to movement. Due to this extra barrier, extraction is degraded.

Collins entertains the following structures for conditionals with *then*. The extra FP layer is responsible for making extraction of the consequent clause degraded.

(87) a. \[ FP \text{ if-clause} \left[ F_{\text{S}} [F_{\text{T}} \text{ then}] \left[ IP \ldots \right]\right] \]
   b. \[ FP \text{ if-clause} \left[ FP \text{ then} \left[ F_{\text{S}} F_{\text{S}}^0 \left[ IP \ldots \right]\right]\right] \]

While Collins does not actually choose (87a) over (87b), he suggests that the structure in (87b) is unable to account for the fact seen in (83) and (84), namely that *if*-clauses can only be clefted in the absence of a *then*. This is putatively so because both (87b) and the structure assumed for *then*-less sentence-initial conditionals involves adjunction. Collins notes that in both these structures the *if*-clause crosses no barriers and thus clefting should be good, irrespective of the presence of *then*. The contrast between the location of the *if*-clause in a sentence-initial conditional without *then* (IP-adjunction) and in (87a) (= \([\text{SpecFP}]\)) is exploited by Collins within a Barriers-style extraction theory to derive the difference in grammaticality between (83a) and (83b), and (84a) and (84b) respectively.

The fact in (83) and (84) can be offered an alternative explanation, however. As Collins notes, the structure in (87b) resembles (88) which is a structure that has been proposed for topicalization.

(88) \[ CP \text{ NP} \left[ CP \text{ Op} \left[ C' \ldots \right]\right] \]

*If*-clauses have been claimed to be *topics* (see Haiman 1978; 1993) and so the structure in (87b) is preferable since it captures the affinity between conditional constructions and topicalizations. The structure in (87b) also makes the parallel with correlatives clearest. Let us consider a variant of this structure.

(89) \[ \text{if-clause}, \left[ \text{then}, \left[ IP \ldots t_i\right]\right] \]

This variant of (87b) eliminates the functional projection FP. The main reason for postulating FP was to provide a barrier that would degrade the extraction of arguments and block the extraction of adjuncts. This blocking effect is created in (89) by the movement of *then*. We assume that *then* needs to move to create a predicate (see Heim and Kratzer 1998).\textsuperscript{29}
That we need to move then is shown by contrasts like the following (= 78).

(90) a. If it rains, then, I think that [we should stay at home].
   b.  'If it rains, I think that then we should stay at home.

(from Izvorski 1997, ex. 29; also see Collins 1989)

For further arguments that the correlative proform undergoes obligatory movement in a number of languages, see Izvorski (1996). This A'-movement of then makes further movements out of the main clause subjacency violations.

The ungrammaticality of then with clefted if-clauses can be related to the marginality of variable binding in it-clefts.

(91) a. No Italian man loves his mother.
   b. ???/?It is no Italian man, who loves his mother.

Under the proposed structure, there needs to be a relationship of variable binding between the conditional clause and then. The clefted structures with then are bad because the structure of the it-cleft does not provide an appropriate configuration for a variable-binding relationship to hold between the if-clause and the then.

What happens when there is no then? In these cases, the if-clause, being an adjunct, can be merged at the IP-level (sentence-initial) or VP-level (sentence-final). As discussed earlier, there seems to be some evidence that an IP-level if-clause has two sources: it may have been merged there or it may have moved there from a VP-adjoined position. In the absence of then, the if-clause behaves like an ordinary free relative.

We could have assumed that in the absence of an overt then, there is always a covert then. However, this option can be ruled out. If a covert then was obligatorily present, it would move like the overt then and therefore block adjunct extractions. We would not find any extractability contrasts that depended upon the presence of then.

4.2.1 If-clauses as definites
As mentioned earlier, two recent semantic treatments of conditional clauses analyze them as plural definite descriptions (see Schein 2001; Schlenker 2004). This is exactly the interpretation that conditionals would receive if they are free relatives involving abstraction over possible worlds. Free relatives involving abstraction over individuals are interpreted as plural definite descriptions of individuals (see Jacobson 1995; Dayal 1996). The semantic arguments put forth by Schein and Schlenker are outside the scope of this chapter, but we will present some of the syntactic facts that Schlenker uses in support of his proposal.

Schlenker notes that if if-clauses are definite world descriptions which furthermore can be doubled by a world pronoun (then), we would expect them to share the binding properties of referential elements. In particular, it can be shown that if-clauses are subject to Condition C of the Binding Theory.

(92) a. [If it were sunny right now], I would see people who would then be getting sunburned.
   b.  'I would then, see people who would be getting sunburned [if it were sunny right now],

30 Conditionals
c. Because I would then, hear lots of people playing on the beach, I would be unhappy [if it were sunny right now],

(Schlenker 2004, ex. 56)

The examples make reference to the time of utterance, as a result of which then has to be interpreted modally and not temporally. Crucially, backwards anaphora between the pronoun and the if-clause is possible, as (92c) shows, yet when the pronoun c-commands the if-clause, coreference is precluded. As Schlenker notes, the natural conclusion is that if-clauses, like other R-expressions, are subject to Condition C of the Binding Theory.

4.3 Some apparent problems for the conditional–correlative link

We have sketched some of the arguments, both conceptual and empirical, for treating conditionals with then in English as a kind of correlative construction. We believe that, on the whole, the evidence supports the analysis of conditionals as correlative constructions and if-clauses as free relatives. However, there are still some hurdles that this assimilatory analysis has to cross.

One may be the absence of low construals in the case of if-clauses, discussed earlier. Free relatives normally allow the variable abstracted over to be long-distance bound by the wh-operator. We suggested that possibly the nature of world variables is such that they need to be locally bound. Still, the issue needs further research.

Another problem arises in the apparent availability of reconstruction in the presence of then. Let us go over the analysis of conditionals with and without then.

(93) a. *Sentence-final if-clause*

Bill will \([VP [VP leave] [CP if Mary comes]].\)

b. *Sentence-initial if-clause, no then*

Structure 1: merger in VP-adjoined position followed by fronting:

\([IP [CP If Mary comes] [Bill will [VP [VP leave] t]]]\)

Structure 2: merger in IP-adjoined position:

\([IP [CP If Mary comes] [IP Bill will leave]]\)

c. *Sentence-initial if-clause, then*

\([IP [CP If Mary comes] [IP then, [Bill will [VP [VP leave] t]]]\]

Note that according to the structures in (93), a sentence-initial if-clause can originate lower than its surface position only when there is no then. When a then is present, it is the then that moves, and not the if-clause.

However, an argument for reconstruction comes from cases like (94) and (95), where the if-clause appears separated from the structure it modifies.

(94) *If John, is sick, he thought that Bill would visit.

(95) *If John, is sick, then he, thought that Bill would visit.

Under the proposed analysis, at LF the if-clause would appear in the c-command domain of he. This explains why coreference between he and John is ruled out in (94).
However, as far as we can tell, the coreference judgments stay the same even if a *then* is present. By the structures in (93), only the *then* has raised in (95). The *if*-clause is merged high. Hence the Condition C effects seen in (95) are unexpected.\(^{31}\)

5  **Factual and relevance conditionals**

The conditionals we have discussed so far are also known as hypothetical conditionals. They are the prototypical example of the conditional construction, but in fact there are also two other types of conditionals.\(^{32}\) Relevance conditionals, also called "conditional speech act," are illustrated below:

(96)  
- a. If I may be honest, you are not looking good.
- b. If you want to know, 4 isn’t a prime number.
- c. If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.

The *if*-clause in relevance conditionals specifies the circumstances in which the consequent is discourse-relevant, not the circumstances in which it is true.

Factual conditionals, on the other hand, carry the presupposition that someone (different than the speaker) believes the proposition expressed by the *if*-clause to be true.\(^ {33}\)

(97)  
- a. This book that I am reading is really stupid.
- b. I haven’t read it but if it is so stupid you shouldn’t bother with it.

(98)  
- a. My friend Joe, whom you haven’t met, is very smart.
- b. Oh yeah? If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?

Languages may employ distinct complementizers/operators to introduce factual conditionals. For instance, in Bulgarian, *štom* ‘when, given that’ may be used in factual conditionals but not in hypothetical or relevance conditionals, which employ *ako* ‘if’.

Relevance and factual conditionals exhibit syntactic behavior distinct from that of hypothetical conditionals. Here we will examine a number of syntactic differences.

5.1  **Relevance conditionals**

Relevance conditionals cannot contain the world proform *then*:

(99)  
- a. *If I may be honest, then you are not looking good*
- b. *If you want to know, then 4 isn’t a prime number.*
- c. *If you are thirsty, then there is beer in the fridge.*

If a *then* is nevertheless used, then the interpretation changes to one of a hypothetical conditional. This follows from the analysis of the semantic contribution of *then* proposed by Iatridou (1994), and discussed above.
In Dutch (and other V2 languages) the if-clause of a hypothetical conditional behaves like the first element for V2, but the antecedent of a relevance conditional does not:

(100) a. Als Jan weggaat ga ik ook weg
    if John away goes go I also away
    ‘If John goes away I will go away too.’
b. ∗Als Jan weggaat ik ga ook weg
c. Als je het wil weten 4 is geen priemgetal
    if you it want know 4 is no prime number
    ‘If you want to know 4 is not a prime number.’
d. ∗Als je het wil weten is 4 geen priemgetal

Again, if a V2 order is forced on a relevance conditional, then it is coerced into a hypothetical.

(101) Als je honger hebt is er een boterham op de tafel.
    if you hunger have is there a sandwich on the table
    ‘If you are hungry there is a sandwich on the table.’

The relevance conditional can only be embedded under speech-act verbs:

(102) a. John said that if you are thirsty there is beer in the fridge.
    b. ∗John believes that if you are thirsty there is beer in the fridge.

There is evidence that even when it is sentence-final, the if-clause of a relevance conditional is attached high, to IP/CP. Relevance conditionals cannot be fronted by VP fronting (nor left stranded):

(103) a. ∗Look sick if I may say so though John does…
    b. ??Look sick though John does if I may say so…

5.2 Factual conditionals

The proposition expressed by the if-clause in a factual conditional is presupposed, as evidenced by the fact that the if-clause cannot associate with focus.

(104) ∗She only should leave [if she is so unhappy].

(105) a. It is if I drink too much wine that I get dizzy.
    b. ∗It is if you like her so much that you should invite her.

(Haegeman and Wekker 1984, 48, exs 11a, 11n)

Similarly to hypothetical, but unlike relevance conditionals, factual conditionals accept the proform then.

(106) a. If it is stupid then you shouldn’t bother with it.
    b. If he’s so smart then why isn’t he rich?

Like the if-clause in a hypothetical conditional, but unlike the antecedent in relevance conditionals, the if-clause in factual conditionals behaves as the first element for V2.
Factual if-clauses cannot be preposed together with the VP in case of VP-fronting; however, they can be stranded.

The above facts suggest that the sentence-final if-clause in a factual conditional is adjoined higher than the VP. Yet Condition C effects also obtain, suggesting that the if-clause is not as high as the matrix IP/CP.

Parasitic gaps are possible in hypothetical conditionals but not in factual conditionals. This contrast cannot be attributed to a difference in attachment sites, because the anti-c-command requirement between the parasitic gap and the licensing variable is satisfied, no matter what the attachment of the if-clause is. Rather, this characteristic of factual antecedents is attributable to their similarity with appositives – that is, they do not permit any dependence that is not satisfied in the clause itself.

5.3 Stacking if-clauses of different types

The discussion above shows that if-clauses of different types attach at different levels. If they appear together, predictably ordering restrictions apply. Sentence-final if-clauses appear in the order hypothetical, factual, relevance. Sentence-initial if-clauses appear in the mirror-image order of the sentence-finals if-clauses – that is, relevance, factual, hypothetical.
6 Other conditional structures

6.1 Adnominal conditionals

The conditionals discussed so far have involved antecedents adjoined to clausal constituents (IP, VP). We have suggested that these should be analyzed on a par with free relative clauses which sometimes appear clause-internally, and sometimes appear in correlative structures. Lasersohn (1996) introduces a class of conditionals which he calls *adnominal* conditionals, where, he argues, the antecedent clause is adjoined to an NP.

(117) But we all know the consequences if we fail.

The structure that Lasersohn suggests has the *if*-clause internal to a DP.

(118) [Det [NP *if*-clause]]

This structure resembles closely the structure for headed relative clauses. Adnominal conditionals can thus be seen as the headed relative counterpart of VP/IP-adjoined conditionals which have been analyzed here as free relative clauses.

Since adnominal conditionals appear DP-internally, they can occur in positions where other DPs can, but where conditional clauses cannot. We have seen earlier that *if*-clauses cannot appear clause-medially unless they are set off by parenthetical intonation.

(119) a. John, if you bother him long enough, will give you five dollars.
   b. *John if you bother him long enough will give you five dollars.

In contrast, adnominal conditionals can appear in clause-medial positions without requiring parenthetical intonation.

(120) a. The fine if you park in a handicapped spot is higher than the fine if your meter expires.
   b. The outcome if John gets his way is sure to be unpleasant for the rest of us.
Evidence for the DP-internal location of the adnominal conditional is also provided by evidence from coordination, as well as the fact that a DP containing an adnominal conditional can be further modified by a relative clause.

(121)  

a. [[The location if it rains] and [the location if it doesn’t rain]] are within five miles of each other.
b. The [[consequences if we fail] [that he mentioned]] are not nearly as bad as the [[consequences if we fail] [that he didn’t mention]].

In certain cases, it seems plausible to treat the nominal expression modified by the adnominal conditional as a concealed question. If we do this, the exceptionality of adnominal conditionals (modifying NPs instead of VP/IPs) seems to disappear.

(122)  

a. We all know the consequences if we fail.
b. We all know [what the consequences will be if we fail].

However, Lasersohn points out that such an approach is not generally tenable because not all nominals modified by adnominal conditionals appear as complements of verbs that take interrogative complements.

Lasersohn considers another approach where the nominal modified by the adnominal conditional could be treated as a concealed free relative.

(123)  

a. the consequences if we fail
b. what(ever) the consequences would be if we fail

This approach seems initially plausible but requires much further justification. For one, the free relative whatever the consequences would be replaces the consequences. This means that the structure of the adnominal construction must be [[Det N if-clause], and not [Det [N if-clause]]. Now consider (121b), which involves restrictive modification by a relative clause. To restrictively modify the free relative, the relative clause must be associated with the consequences. However, what it needs to really modify is consequences [if we fail] and there does not seem to be any constituent in the free relative with equivalent semantics.

Instead Lasersohn provides a semantics to interpret [N if-clause] structures directly. According to his semantics, [N if-clause] picks out objects in the denotation of N in the words where the if-clause holds. The objects in the denotation of N have to exist in the world where the if-clause holds but need not exist in the actual world. Therefore an adnominal conditional gives us a way of making reference to non-existent objects.

6.2 Reduced conditionals

Typically, the consequents of conditionals constitute well-formed sentences by themselves.

(124)  

a. If it is sunny, then I will go to the park.
b. Then I will go to the park.
Schwarz (1998) discusses a class of conditionals from German where the consequent does not constitute a well-formed sentence by itself.

(125) **Reduced conditional**

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<td>a.</td>
<td>Wenn einer den Peter besucht, dann der Hans.</td>
<td>if someone-NOM the-ACC Peter visits then the-NOM Hans</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘If someone visits Peter then it’s Hans.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Wenn der Hans wen besucht, dann den Peter.</td>
<td>if the-NOM Hans someone-ACC visits then the-ACC Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘If Hans visits someone then it’s Peter.’</td>
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(126) a. *Dann der Hans then the-NOM Hans |
|   | b. *Dann den Peter then the-ACC Peter |

Reduced conditionals can be related to the corresponding unreduced conditional by supplying material from the antecedent. Thus (125a) and (125b) can be taken to involve the following reductions respectively.

(127) a. Wenn einer den Peter besucht, dann besucht der Hans den Peter. |
|   | ‘If someone visits Peter then it’s Hans.’ |   |
| b. Wenn der Hans wen besucht, dann besucht der Hans den Peter. |
|   | ‘If Hans visits someone then it’s Peter.’ |   |

However, reduced conditionals seem to have several properties, both syntactic and semantic, that suggest that they are not merely reduced versions of their unreduced counterparts. Structurally reduced conditionals differ from full conditionals in that *dann* ‘then’ is obligatory in reduced conditionals but optional in full conditionals. Interpretively too, reduced conditionals differ from full conditionals on several properties identified by Schwarz (1998). The first difference is that the antecedent of a reduced conditional must contain an indefinite.

(128) **Indefiniteness requirement**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Wenn ich den Karl besuche, dann immer den Peter.</td>
<td>if I the-ACC Karl visit then always the-ACC Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Wenn ich den Karl besuche, dann besuche ich immer den Peter.</td>
<td>if I the-ACC Karl visit then visit I always the-ACC Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘If I visit Karl then I always visit Peter.’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Wenn ich wen besuche, dann immer den Peter.</td>
<td>if I someone-ACC visit then always the-ACC Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘If I visit someone then it’s always Peter.’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second distinction is shown in (129), which shows that reduced conditionals introduce presuppositional requirements which unreduced conditionals do not.
(129) The presupposition effect

a. Wenn ich was zum Lesen mitnehme, dann immer meine Brille.
If I something to read along-take then always my glasses
‘If I take something to read then it’s always my glasses.’

b. Wenn ich was zum Lesen mitnehme, dann nehme ich immer
if I something to read along-take then take I always
meine Brille mit.
my glasses along
‘If I take something to read then I always take my glasses.’

(129a) comes with a presupposition to the effect that glasses are something to read and so it is perceived to be deviant. There is no such presupposition associated with (129).

Schwarz refers to the third distinction as the exhaustiveness effect. This effect is exemplified by (130).

(130) The exhaustiveness effect

a. Wenn ich wen besuche, dann immer den Peter.
if I someone-ACC visit then always the-ACC Peter
‘If I visit someone then it’s always Peter.’
(I cannot visit anybody other than Peter.)

b. Wenn ich wen besuche, dann besuche ich immer
if I someone-ACC visit then visit I always
den Peter.
the-ACC Peter
‘If I visit someone then I always visit Peter.’
(I may visit people other than Peter.)

(130a) and (130b) are both grammatical. However, as indicated, they differ in their truth conditions.

According to Schwarz, these differences between reduced and unreduced conditionals follow if we assume that both the antecedent and the consequent clause in a reduced conditional make reference to the same event. In contrast, the antecedent and the consequent of an unreduced conditional can make reference to distinct events.

The indefiniteness requirement illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (128a) comes about as follows. Since (128a) is a reduced conditional, both the antecedent and the consequent make reference to the same event. For the truth of (128a), it is necessary that events of me visiting Karl are events of me visiting Peter. Now by the assumption that we only consider minimal events, an event of me visiting Karl cannot simultaneously be an event of me visiting Peter. Thus (128a) is false if there is an event of me visiting Karl. From De Swart (1993), we know that multi-case conditionals are felicitous only when there are at least two distinct events for the proposition expressed by the antecedent. The sentence is thus false whenever it is felicitous. In other words, it presupposes that it is false. Schwarz suggests that sentences that presuppose their falsehood are ungrammatical. This is why (128a) is ungrammatical.

The presupposition effect and the exhaustiveness effect also follow from the assumption that reduced conditionals involve the same event, and that events are minimal. For the truth of (129a), the minimal event of me taking something
to read must involve my glasses. For this event to be truly minimal, my glasses must be something to read. If not, we could always remove them and have a more minimal event. This is why the (129a) presupposes that my glasses are something to read. The unreduced conditional in (129b) does not introduce such a presupposition because here the antecedent and the consequent make reference to distinct events. The event corresponding to the antecedent and the event corresponding to the consequent are both minimal, but since they are distinct events, minimality of events can be satisfied without presupposing that glasses are things to read.

The exhaustiveness effect follows similarly. For the truth of (130a), a minimal event of me visiting someone must be a minimal event of me visiting Karl. However, as noted earlier, a minimal event of me visiting Karl cannot also be a minimal event of me visiting Peter. Again, the possibility of having distinct events in the antecedent and the consequent of a unreduced conditional is responsible for the absence of an exhaustiveness effect. Since the antecedent and the consequent pick out distinct events, a minimal event of me visiting someone does not have to be identified with minimal events of me visiting Karl. The possibility is left open that there are minimal events of me visiting Peter.

6.3 Chinese bare conditionals

Bare conditionals in Chinese involve no obligatory overt marking in either the antecedent or the consequent clause. Optionally, jiū ‘then’ may be present in the consequent clause. It is, however, not clear whether the presence of jiū ‘then’ is not in fact indicative of another conditional structure in Mandarin Chinese – a conditional introduced by the complementizer ‘rúguŏ’ (what Cheng and Huang 1996 call ‘rúguŏ-’conditional), given that rúguŏ ‘if’ may be dropped in certain cases.

Bare conditionals are further characterized by the presence of one or more wh-words in the antecedent clause matched by an equal wh-word in the consequent (see Cheng and Huang 1996). This last requirement is what distinguishes bare conditionals from rúguŏ- conditionals, given that rúguŏ ‘if’ need not appear overtly.

(131) shei yan shei, shei jiu xiang shei
who plays who who then resemble who
‘If X plays the role of Y, X then will resemble Y.’

The two other types of conditional structures in Chinese, rúguŏ- and dou- conditionals, may have wh-words in the antecedent; however, they need not have an anaphoric element in the consequent clause, and if they do, the anaphor cannot be a wh-word itself.

(132) a. “rúguŏ ni kandao shei qing jiao shei lai jian wo
if you see who please tell who come see me
‘If you see someone, please tell him/her to come see me.’

b. rúguŏ ni kandao shei qing jiao tal/ Ø /na-ge-ren lai jian wo
if you see who please tell him/ Ø /that-CLF-person come see me
‘If you see someone, please tell him/her/that person to come see me.’

The interpretation of bare conditionals involves unselective binding by the (possibly covert) operator present in conditionals (as in Kratzer 1991), in the analyses of
Cheng and Huang (1996) and Chierchia (2000). The two analyses differ as to the exact interpretation they assign to wh-words. Whereas for Cheng and Huang the wh-words are variables, bound DRT-style, for Chierchia they start out existentially quantified, but then a pair (one for each clause) of disclosure operators, associated with the conditional operator, remove the existential quantifier, and leave the wh-words to be bound by the conditional operator. The two approaches’ articulated LFs are given below:

(133) a. Operator, λx_i [⋯x_i⋯] λx_i [⋯x_i⋯]  
    (Cheng and Huang 1996)

b. Operator, λx_i [⋯∃x_i x_i⋯] λx_i [⋯∃x_i x_i⋯]  
    (Chierchia 2000)

A schematized LF of a bare conditional, and its interpretation, would be as follows:

(134) a. Operator, [⋯wh_i⋯][⋯wh_i⋯]  

b. ∀x [⋯x⋯][⋯x⋯]

In sum, it is the syntactic dependency between the operator and the variables that it binds that makes bare conditionals conditional.

7 Conclusions

Various questions arise in the syntax of conditionals, as we have seen in this chapter. We have tried to present some of the most important issues, and to relate distinct proposals that exist in the literature. We have also proposed a view that is distinct from previous analyses of conditionals, namely that conditional clauses are free relatives of possible worlds. Accordingly, conditionals with then are correlative structures. This view makes a number of facts about the syntactic behavior of conditionals and their interpretation fall out naturally.

Needless to say, many interesting questions have remained unaddressed. We have alluded to some, while some have not even been mentioned – these include, among others, issues of compositionality with only if and even if conditionals, exceptive and concessive conditionals, and the link with exceptive and concessive structures more generally.

SEE ALSO: Adverb Classes and Adverb Placement; Free Relatives; Left Periphery of the Clause

Notes

1. This chapter is largely unchanged from the previous edition. We would like to draw the attention of our readers to the following papers that have appeared in the intervening years: Haegeman (2010), who develops an explicit syntactic proposal for some ideas explored in section 3.2, Von Fintel (2007), and Von Fintel (2012), which are two very useful semantically oriented surveys of conditionals, Kratzer (in press), who offers an argument that in some cases we have to allow conditionals to restrict quantifiers, and Iatridou (in press), who argues for a broader conception of conditional than the
if-clause-based conception we limit ourselves to here. We do not discuss these in detail here since, with the exception of Haegeman (2010), this new literature has a largely semantic bent. (See also Free Relatives.)

2. For this reason, relevance conditionals are often called *speech act conditionals*.

3. Some of these clausal adverbials are known as adverbials of contingency in traditional grammar (see Quirk et al. 1985): conditionals (e.g., *if q, p*), resultatives (e.g., *p, so q*), causatives (e.g., *because q, p*), exceptives (e.g., *p, except (that) q*), purpose clauses (e.g., *p, so that q*), and concessives (e.g., *although q, p*), where *p* is the proposition expressed by the main clause, and *q* is the proposition expressed by the adverbial clause.

4. See Iatridou (2000) who argues that the conditional mood is further decomposable, and one of its constituents is a past-tense morpheme, which, however, is not interpreted along a temporal but along a modal dimension.

5. By “purely syntactic” we mean the absence of accompanying insertion of a specialized lexical item or the appearance of specialized inflection. Of course, syntax still underlies the use of lexical items such as the complementizer *if*, or the licensing of conditional inflection on the verb.

6. Technically, the ‘when/if’ ambiguity obtains only in non-past clauses since past tense temporal adverbials require a different temporal relative pronoun, *wann*.

7. Finally, epistemic and optative modality, copulas, and topic markers are typologically very often employed in conditionals (see Traugott et al. 1986); some examples are given below:

   (i) Arrernte
   a. Ingwenthe peke kwatye urnte-me.
      tomorrow maybe water fall
      ‘Perhaps it will rain tomorrow.’
   b. Kwatye peke urnte-me, ayenge petye-tyekenhe.
      water maybe fall 1SGS come-VB-NEG
      ‘If it rains I won’t come.’

   (see Wierzbicka 1997)

8. And, given the absence of subject–verb agreement, pro-drop in such conditionals is impossible in Russian. All these features, in addition to the adjoined status of the conditional clause, distinguish a conditional such as (10) from a conjoined imperative with a conditional meaning, as in (i), again from Jacab (in press).

   (i) Udar’ menja i ty ob etom požaleješ!
      hit-2SG me and you-SG about this regret
      ‘Hit me (you-SG) and you will be sorry about it.’

9. Similar facts obtain in the case of free adjuncts in English. A free adjunct such as the one in (i) can be interpreted as an adjunct of condition, cause, or concession, depending in part on the tense of the matrix clause:

   (i) a. Working hard, I will finish at 8.
       b. Working hard, I finished at 8.

   Stump (1985) proposes that the grammar assigns a conjunctive interpretation to a free adjunct structure (*I (will) work(ed) hard and I will finish(ed) at 8*), with context providing the eventual interpretation.

10. Consider (i):

   (i) a. Never before has Dana seen anything like this.
       b. Only with Rebecca will Pat be happy.
11. A language in which Comrie claims this is the case is Turkish. As far as we have been able to verify with native speakers, however, all the following word orders are possible in Turkish:

    we if weather sunny be-PRS-COND out go-FUT-2PL
    ‘If it is sunny we will go out.’

   we out go-FUT-2PL if weather sunny be-PRS-COND
   ‘We will go out if it is sunny.’

   if weather sunny be-PRS-COND we out go-FUT-2PL
   ‘If it is sunny, we’ll go out.’

12. Additionally, Greenberg and Comrie’s typological claim may need to be qualified. Geis (1985) cites Zwicky (p.c.) for the claim that there are languages which cannot place if-clauses in sentence-initial position. We have not been able to verify this claim for a particular language.

13. Geis (1985) points out that Heinämäki (1974) proposed that temporal connectives like when, before, and until be analyzed as coordinating conjunctions. Given the similarities between when and if, it seems reasonable to assume that Heinämäki’s proposal could extend to if.

14. Assuming an approach to adverbials as specifiers of functional projections, as in Alexiadou (1997) and Cinque (1999), would naturally involve an analysis of sentence-initial if-clauses as specifiers of a covert functional head. See Valmala (2009) for a proposal along these lines for both sentence-initial and sentence-final adverbials.

15. In this they resemble because-clauses.

(1) Mary didn’t vote for Bush because she supported Nader.
   a. … she voted for Bush because she is rich.  ¬> because
   b. … she voted for Nader  because > ¬

See Linebarger (1987) for extensive discussion of cases like these. An anonymous reviewer reminds us that our claim about the height of attachment of if-clauses from their scope with negation relies on the non-trivial assumption that the negation is at the same structural location in the two readings.

16. This sentence only has a reading where John’s thinking is conditional on his being sick – i.e., where the matrix clause is part of the consequent.

17. Unless, just by virtue of being adjoined to IP as a result of QR, the quantifier can have scope over the IP-adjoined adverbial clause. May (1985) proposed in fact that quantified expressions adjoined to IP can be interpreted in each other’s scopes. An anonymous reviewer notes that weak crossover is not necessarily implicated here – whether it is would depend upon the kind of movement involved. For example, topicalization does not create a weak crossover configuration as noted by Lasnik and Stowell (1991).

18. This test cannot be replicated in conditionals since infinitival conditionals are ungrammatical in English.

(i) a. * If to come, Bill will leave.
    b. * When to come, Bill will leave.

The ungrammaticality of (ia) follows if we assume that if is in C⁰ and illicitly governs PRO. (Of course, this account retains government as a theoretical construct, and uses it further to constrain the distribution of PRO, and both of these approaches have been
challenged.) The location of when in SpecCP does not predict the ungrammaticality of (ib). The ungrammaticality follows if we assume that (i) non-interrogative when-clauses are free relatives, and (ii) infinitival free relatives are ungrammatical in English, and perhaps cross-linguistically (see Izvorski 1998). Note further that treating conditional if-clauses analogously to free relatives would give (ia) and (ib) a uniform explanation.

19. Consider (i), which is a case of V2 in an embedded clause, which obtains in case the complementizer is not present:

(i) German
   a. Er sagt, dass die Kinder diesen Film gesehen haben.
      he says that the kids this film seen have
      ‘He says that the kids have seen this movie.’
   b. Er sagt, diesen Film haben die Kinder gesehen.
      he says this film have the kids seen
      ‘He says that the kids have seen this movie.’

The facts of (i) are particularly telling, because if it were only for the root-embedded asymmetry of V2, we could not conclude much, given that a similar root-embedded asymmetry exists in English questions, where matrix questions exhibit I-to-C movement, but embedded ones do not, despite the fact that wh-phrases are considered to be in SpecCP and not in C0.

20. The absence of inversion – i.e., V2 in German wenn clauses – follows from the fact that wenn clauses are free relatives and free relatives, unlike questions, do not permit V2. Grewendorf (2015) offers an intriguing set of facts which he dubs Bavarian Extraction that are potentially relevant for the structural location of wenn. In Grewendorf’s analysis, Bavarian allows for fronting within the wenn-clause to a position in front of wenn (= ia). However, such fronting is also possible with clear wh-phrases (= ib). This suggests that the Bavarian Extraction data in (ia) is silent as to the exact structural status of wenn.

   i. a. [[De Mass], wenn i t, no drink], bin i bsuffa.
       this liter if I still drink am I drunk
       ‘If I still drink this liter of beer, I will be drunk.’
       (Grewendorf 2015, p. 232, ex. 1)
   b. [[Ann Sepp], wer (dass) t, gseng hod], woaß i ned.
      the Sepp_Acc who that seen has know I not
      ‘I don’t know who saw Sepp.’
      (Grewendorf 2015, p. 247, ex. 34)

21. It has to be noted that the ambiguity obtains only with sentence-final when-clauses. When when-clauses are sentence-initial, only local (high) construals are available:

   (i) When you say you’ll leave, I’ll leave. unambiguous

At least this is the case with neutral intonation. If the when-clause is interpreted as focused, then ambiguity becomes a possibility, which may be due to the fact that in such a case the when-clause is moved from sentence-final position. Sentence-initial when-clauses would still presumably involve A’-movement. Thus an account of the absence of low construals in terms of absence of A’-movement is undermined.

22. Philippe Schlenker suggested to us the relevance of Orin Percus’ work in this respect. Percus (2000) argues that some world variables need to be locally bound.
23. Curiously, while in English contracted negation can be moved with I to C in questions, it may not be in conditionals. The following sentences are from Iatridou and Embick (1994, exs 8a–8c):

(i)  
   a. Hadn’t he seen the car coming?
   b. “Hadn’t he seen the car coming, he would have been killed.
   c. Had he not seen the car coming, he would have been killed.

24. There is some suggestion that non-counterfactual inverted conditionals are special – in Icelandic and Old English indicative inverted conditionals are not technically “indicative” since the raised verb in C has to be subjunctive.

(i) Icelandic
   a. Ef hann hefur faridh eg kom  
      if he has-PRES.IND gone I come  
      ‘If he has gone, I will come.’
   b. Hafi hann faridh eg kom  
      has-PRES.SUBJ he gone I come  
      ‘If he has gone, I will come.’
   c. ‘Hefur hann faridh eg kom  
      has-PRES.IND he gone I come  
      ‘If he has gone, I will come.’
   d. ‘Ef hann hafi faridh eg kom  
      if he has-PRES.SUBJ gone I come  
      ‘If he has gone, I will come.’

(Iatridou and Embick 1994, exs 7a–7d)

The subjunctive is also used in concessive (‘although, even though’) clauses which are normally taken to presuppose the truth of the proposition they express.

25. The choice condition is meant to restrict the proposal to languages which allow “optionality” of this kind, as there are languages which do not permit free relatives inside the clause (e.g., according to Srivastav 1991, free relatives in Hindi cannot appear in argument position). For this latter type of languages see Bhatt (2003).

26. Care should be taken to interpret the whole antecedent as the associate of even. In cases when some constituent of the antecedent is the associate of even, then should be acceptable.

27. The other syntactic option, without verb-raising, is also unacceptable:

(i) #Only if it is sunny then I will visit you.

28. An anonymous reviewer has pointed out to us that this pattern does not generalize to Dutch als … dan conditionals.

29. It is also plausible that then, being a bare NP-adverb in the sense of Larson (1985), needs to be merged lower in the tree where it can be licensed. In this it would differ from if-clauses that could be merged high or low.

30. We find this example slightly marginal. It becomes perfect with then A′-moved to the front of the matrix clause. This does not affect Schlenker’s argument.

31. These effects are a problem only if we assume that reconstruction effects imply movement. As much work on connectivity has argued, such an assumption is far from obvious.

32. The discussion in this section is based on Iatridou (1991).

33. Thus, the antecedent if p in a factual conditional can always be substituted by if it is true that p.
34. Though see Romero (2000) for an alternative analysis of reduced conditionals in German. Romero argues that the distinctions between full and reduced conditionals can be derived without stipulating different LF representations for full and reduced conditionals.

References


**Further Reading**